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Abstract
This paper presents a framework to determine optimal resource allocation over time for
the production of a good by heterogeneous producers who generate a stock externality. We
analyze the optimal intertemporal and quality-speci¯c combination of abatement strategies
at the source given by a change in the intensity of production and in the chosen technol-
ogy, and/or removal of existing pollution stock. The results show how the speci¯cations of
the production and the emission functions a®ect technology adoption and the design of the
optimal intertemporal combination of source and stock abatement strategies. Moreover, the
paper shows that regulation at the intensive margin cannot be considered as a substitute for
a regulation at the extensive margin. The paper employs the so-called two-stage solution
approach for solving the resulting quality distributed-intertemporal optimal control problem.
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Major environmental policy problems, including climate change and water-quality deteriora-
tion, are stock externality problems (Farzin, 1996; Baudry, 2000). The accumulating pollutants
are frequently the result of application of inputs (water, chemicals, fossil fuels) by heteroge-
neous producers. Emission of small producers and large factories contribute to climate change,
and runo® of both family and corporate farms contribute to the contamination of bodies of
water. Thus, the design of policies to control stock externalities should consider both time and
heterogeneity dimensions of these problems and the technologies that a®ect accumulation of
pollutants.
The buildup of the stock externality can be modi¯ed either through changes in production
practices (source abatement) or, when possible, by removal of existing pollution stock (stock
abatement). Source abatement can be achieved by reducing input use levels (control at the
intensive margin), by retiring production units (extensive margin), and through adoption of
modern technologies (extensive margin) (Khanna and Zilberman, 1997). The latter category of
source abatement consists of technologies that improve technical e±ciency of variable inputs and
either reduce or enhance the associated pollution (Fuglie and Kascak, 2001). Examples include
insulation, fuel-e±cient engines and stoves (Edwards et al., 2004), and improved quality fuels
that reduce the pollution intensity of energy generation, transportation, temperature control,
or cooking. Drip, sprinkler, and computerized irrigation and high precision chemical applica-
tions are examples of agricultural technologies that improve productivity and reduce damaging
residues. Stock abatement reduces pollution once it has been generated, for example, by cat-
alytic converters, barriers (e.g., plants, containing walls in the case of water pollution), or by
sequestration of the pollutant (e.g., forest management in the case of CO2 emissions).
There are three di®erent strands of literature addressing stock pollution problems. The ¯rst
investigates whether and when to adopt a modern technology in solving stock externality prob-
lems. Examples include the use of e±ciency-enhancing technologies in the energy-generating sec-
tor (Siegel and Temchin, 1991; Chakravorty et al., 1997; Khanna and Zilberman, 1999), energy-
saving appliances (Hausman, 1979; Ja®e and Stavins, 1995), irrigation technologies (Khanna et
al. 2002), and variable input application rates and soil testing (Wu and Babcock, 1998). A sec-
ond strand of papers focuses on economics of reduction of pollution stocks. For example, Hongli
et al. (2002) identify conditions when the use of minimum tillage increases carbon sequestration
rates, which, in turn moderates global warming. A third line of research analyzes the optimal
1combination of source abatement versus stock abatement. Shah et al. (1995) present a dynamic
framework to analyze the optimal combination of on-farm and o®-farm pollution abatement
strategies for waterlogging problems. Similarly, Farzin (1996) in a more general context devel-
ops a dynamic framework to analyze modi¯cation of static policy instruments in the presence
of a stock externality.
The existing papers either establish the optimal intertemporal policy assuming homogene-
ity of the production units, or neglect the intertemporal aspect of the pollution problem if
they consider heterogeneity. In this paper we integrate both aspects, developing a model that
incorporates both heterogeneity and time.
The paper modi¯es the two-stage optimal control approach of Goetz and Zilberman (2000),
which is similar to the dynamic optimization technique in Segerstrom (1999). The ¯rst stage
consists of a static analysis of choices at the extensive and intensive margins by heterogeneous
¯rms. The aggregate outcomes of this analysis are then utilized to determine resource allocation
and pricing over time. With this approach, it is possible to derive optimal policies that determine
the timing and use of stock abatement and a®ect the ¯rms' decisions at the intensive margin
(choices of variable inputs) and the extensive margin (adoption of modern technologies and
retirement of units). Our results suggest that policies, which target exclusively the reduction of
input use, are in general not optimal since they produce a distortion at the extensive margin.
In contrast to Pan and Hodge (1994) or Glaeser and Shleifer (2001), we show that regulations
at the extensive and intensive margins should not be considered as substitutes but, rather, as
indispensable complements. We show that the distortions of pollution control policies that target
only reduction of variable input use have to be corrected by the design of economic incentives that
trigger the adoption of clean technologies and discourage the adoption of dirty technologies. The
results also show how the speci¯cations of the production and pollution-generating technologies
a®ect the pattern of adoption of modern technologies and how they a®ect the design of dynamic
environmental policies.
The results show that the temporal aspect of the regulation is of great importance, since
it determines the optimal mix and degree of severity of the policy measures. A late interven-
tion, when the stock of pollution is above its steady-state value, drastically reduces production
intensity below its steady-state level and then increases this intensity over time. Moreover, the
dynamic framework allows for the possibility of removing the pollutant once it has been gener-
ated (stock abatement). In this way it is possible to evaluate the incentives for source abatement
versus stock abatement. If abatement cost is highly convex, most likely it is optimal to rely on
2abatement at the source, according to the speci¯c conditions of each producer, and to have little
stock abatement. However, if the marginal stock abatement cost increases slowly, the optimal
intertemporal policy is characterized by high stock abatement. As a general result, this paper
o®ers formulations of individually tailored dynamic policies to induce socially optimal behavior
by the individual agents taking into account the speci¯cation of available technologies.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the basic features of the model.
Section 3 establishes the optimal environmental policy, consisting of the optimal static and
intertemporal solution. Section 4 de¯nes individually tailored and intertemporal policies with
respect to the level of input and the choice of technologies that can establish the social optimum.
Section 5 concludes the paper.
2. The modeling framework
Consider a competitive industry made of heterogeneous production units (¯elds or plants),
which produces a good using ¯xed assets (land or machines) and variable inputs (water, chem-
icals, fossil fuels) based on di®erent technologies. The production units di®er by quality of the
asset ², ² 2 [0;1], where a higher ² corresponds to higher quality. In the case of land, ² measures
the site productivity and environmental vulnerability of the location. For instance, ² may stand
for the capacity of land to retain inputs (water or chemicals). In this way, higher ² results in
higher productivity and lower residues. Similarly, machines with higher ² may be of improved
vintage, with higher input-use e±ciency and lower leakage coe±cients. The asset can be used
with di®erent technologies. For simplicity, we concentrate on the case where only two alternative
technologies i; i = 1;2; are available. The variable i = 1 stands for the modern technology and
i = 2 for the traditional one. The modern technologies alter the functional relation between
input and output, and input and emissions. First, modern technology may be embodied in
equipment. For instance, better cooking stoves improve fuel e±ciency, reduce in-house air pol-
lution, and reduce contribution to climate change (Edwards et al., 2004). Likewise in agriculture,
modern irrigation technologies increase e±ciency of water-use and reduce leaching of pollutants.
Alternatively, the modern technology may also be embodied in extra e®ort. A key element of
Integrated Pest Management is the monitoring of pest populations to increase the precision of
chemical applications (Committee on the Future Role of Pesticides in US Agriculture, 2000).
Finally, modern technology may be embodied by a higher quality input. For instance, the use of
cleaner fuels in the transportation sector reduces urban pollution and greenhouse gas emissions
3(Nakata, 2000). Let x1(t;²) denote the share of the ¯xed asset with quality ² utilized with mod-
ern technology (i = 1), and x2(t;²) in the form of traditional technology (i = 2), at each moment
of time t. Hence, we have
P2
i=1 xi(t;²) · 1. Thus, according to this notation, the complete
retirement of production units takes place when
P2
i=1 xi(t;²) = 0. Production functions for
every ² exhibit constant returns to scale. The total amount of assets available in the industry is
given by X. The amount of asset of quality ² in relation to the total amount of assets is given
by the density function l(²), with
R ²1
²0 l(²)d² = 1, and l(²) > 0; 8² 2 [²0;²1]. Thus, the amount
of asset available with quality ² is given by X l(²).
Let ui(t;²) be the variable input per unit of ¯xed asset (pesticides per acre, fuel per unit
of machine capacity). Output per unit of ¯xed asset utilized in the form of technology i is yi =
hi(²)f(ui(t;²)); i = 1;2, with fui > 0 and fuiui < 0, where the subscript of a function with respect
to a variable denotes its partial derivative. We assume that asset quality and the way that it is
utilized a®ect productivity through a multiplicative ¯xed asset e®ect represented by hi(²), where
h(¢) is C2, and hi(0) = 0. For simplicity, we assume for the traditional technology that h2(²) =
²; 8². For each technology, assets of higher quality are more productive, dhi
d² > 0, and adoption
of modern technology tends to increase ¯xed asset productivity, h1(²) > h2(²);for; 0 < ² < 1.
We distinguish between two speci¯cations of the technology impacts on the asset productivity.
The ¯rst is the case of technology and asset quality substitution, TAS, where d2h1
d²2 · 0 and
h1(1) = h2(1) = 1. In this case the new technology is e®ective of augmenting the quality of
lower quality assets, but the augmentation declines with ². For instance, the advantage of modern
agricultural irrigation techniques compared to traditional irrigation techniques diminishes with
land quality (water-holding capacity) as land quality approaches 1, since the loss of salts and
minerals is cut back. With supplementary devices for combustion engines, the increase in fuel
e±ciency is reduced as the vintage of the engine is of a more recent vintage. The second is the
case of technology and asset quality complementarity, TAC, where d2h1
d²2 ¸ 0 and thus h1(1) À 1.
In this case the multiplicative e®ect of the new technology is exacerbating the di®erence in
productivity among assets. For example, when ¯rms di®er in their human capital, those with
highly quali¯ed human capital are likely to gain more from the use of computer software than
those with less quali¯ed human capital. The gain from agricultural pest management techniques
increases as the quality of the land improves.
Output price is denoted by p, and it is assumed to be constant. Input price is denoted
by ci; i = 1;2. We assume that c1 ¸ c2, that is, input price is higher if modern technology is
embodied in the applied input, e.g., higher seed price in the case of cultivation of transgenic
4crops. Each form of the utilization of the ¯xed asset di®ers in its operational costs per unit
of ¯xed asset, denoted by Ii. Operational costs include the costs of inputs such as labor (e.g.,
costs of extra monitoring in the case of Integrated Pest Management), the rental or annualized
costs of equipment (e.g., to employ the services of contractors or purchase equipment that can
be resold), and the cost of technology licensing or other fees associated with improved input
quality. Furthermore, we assume that I1 > I2, i.e., the modern technology is more costly.
The pollutant generated in the production process accumulates over time. Following Millock
et al. (2002), we consider two formulations of the pollution generation function gi(ui(t;²);²). The
¯rst is pollution as an input externality. In this case the pollution is assumed to be emanating
from the use of an input, e.g., fertilizer residue, and the pollution function is convex in ui with
giui > 0; giuiui ¸ 0. Since higher quality assets have higher input use e±ciency, they generate
less residue, and pollution decreases with quality, i.e., gi² < 0 and giui ² < 0. We assume that the
modern technology in the case of an input externality is a precision technology, reducing pollution
given input use and asset quality. Speci¯cally, we have that g1(u1;²) < g2(u2;²); 8u1 = u2 > 0
and ² < 1; and gi(ui;1) = 0. In the second formulation we assume pollution as an output
externality where it is proportional to output (e.g., output contains a toxic material or causes
environmental damage), that is, gi(ui(t;²);²) = ®yi, where ® is the pollutant generated per unit
of output. Therefore, the pollution function is strictly concave in ui with giui > 0, giuiui < 0, and
giui ² > 0. In this situation, modern technology is more polluting than the traditional technology,
that is, g1(u1;²) = ®h1(²)f(u1;²) > ®h2(²)f(u2;²) = g2(u2;²); 8u1 = u2 > 0 and ² > 0; and
g1(u1;0) = g2(u2;0) = 0.
The aggregate pollution stock at time t is s(t), and the temporal economic loss of pollution
stock per period is given by the monetary damage function m(s(t)), with m(0) = 0, ms > 0, and
mss > 0. The pollution stock may be reduced by various abatement activities. Let ´(t) denote
the amount of stock abatement at time t, and k(´(t);s(t)) stock abatement cost. We assume
that marginal cost of stock abatement is positive, that is, k´ > 0 and ks > 0, and jointly convex
in ´ and s. In particular, we consider the case of a cleanup technology where the marginal
abatement cost with respect to ´ is independent of s, and where it is decreasing in the pollution
stock, i.e., k´s · 0. Finally, we allow also for the case where marginal abatement cost increase
with s, i.e., k´s > 0.








X l(²)d² ¡ ´(t) ¡ ³s(t); (1)
5where a dot over a variable denotes the operator d
dt. The parameter ³; 0 < ³ < 1 represents the
natural decay rate of the pollutant stock.
3. The dynamics of the pollution stock problem
A social planner is assumed to maximize the present discount value of net bene¯ts from

































X l(²)d² ¡ ´(t) ¡ ³s(t);







X l(²) ¸ 0; ´(t) 2 [0;s(t)];
where s0 denotes the pollution stock at time 0 and ± > 0 is the social discount rate. Utilizing
Pontryagin's Maximum Principle, the current Hamiltonian of the optimal pollution restoration






















X l(²)d² ¡ ´(t) ¡ ³s(t)
´
:
1We assume that the output price is not in°uenced by the production of the externality. We also assume that
the utility function of the consumers is quasilinear with respect to the traded goods and the externality. Thus, the
optimal level of the externality is independent of the consumers' expenditures, and it is possible to derive a utility
function which depends only on the externality s (Mas-Colell et al., 1995). To discuss the results of our model in
a practical setting, we propose that the derived utility function be represented by the damage function m(s(t))
and the stock abatement cost function k(´(t);s(t)). The assumption made with respect to the quasilinearity of
the utility function helps to keep the model simple, and it allows us to concentrate on our analysis to answer the
question of whether or not it is socially optimal to abate at the source or to abate the pollution stock, and which
is the optimal policy to achieve the socially optimal outcome.
6To facilitate the interpretations of the costate variable ¹, it has been multiplied by minus
one. The arguments ² and t of the variables and the Lagrange multipliers to be introduced later
will be suppressed to simplify the notation unless it is required for an unambiguous notation.
Taking account of the constraints leads to the Lagrangian: L ´ H + (!1u1 + !2u2 + !3x1 +
!4x2+!5(1¡x1¡x2))Xl+!6´+!7(s¡´), where !1;:::;!7 denote Lagrange multipliers. The
solution of problem (S) has to satisfy the following necessary conditions2 stated in accordance
with Theorem 1 in Seierstad and Syds½ter, (1987, p. 276)
Lui ´ (phifui ¡ ci ¡ ¹giui)xi + !i = 0; (2)
Lxi ´ pyi ¡ ciui ¡ Ii ¡ ¹gi + !i+2 ¡ !5 = 0; (3)
L´ ´ ¡k´ + ¹ + !6 ¡ !7 = 0; (4)








X ld² ¡ ´ ¡ ³s;
s(0) = s0: (6)
Since the analytical solution of the necessary conditions (2) - (6) is di±cult to obtain, we propose
to solve problem (S) by a two-stage solution technique described in the following proposition.
Proposition 1: The solution of the optimization problem S is equivalent to the solution of two
sequential problems, denoted by S1 and S2. In the ¯rst stage (problem S1), the social net bene¯ts
are maximized over ² given a prespeci¯ed level of aggregate emissions z. The solution consists
of the optimal trajectories of ui(²) and xi(²); i = 1;2. In the second stage (problem S2), the
prespeci¯ed level of aggregate emissions z becomes a decision variable; and the optimal value
function of the ¯rst stage is optimized over time yielding the optimal path of s(t), z(t), ´(t), and
consequently of ui(t;²), and xi(t;²); i = 1;2.
Due to the fact that the state variable of problem (S) depends exclusively on time and
not on ², one is able to decompose part of the problem into a static optimization problem over
quality, and another part into a dynamic control problem. In the ¯rst-stage problem, the use
of resources over the heterogeneous characteristic of the production units is optimized, i.e., for
every quality ², we determine the optimal amount of variable input and the way the ¯xed asset
should be utilized, including the option not to utilize it at all. The value function associated
2We assume that the solution of the necessary conditions is the global optimum, in particular, for the case of
an output externality where the emission function is concave.
7with the ¯rst stage problem is then plugged into the dynamic control problem to determine the
optimal combination of the di®erent abatement options.
3.1. The solution to the optimization problem over quality
In the ¯rst stage the solution of the social planner's decision problem (S1) is given by the
value function V (z) de¯ned as:3




























X l(²) ¸ 0;
where z denotes the aggregate emissions over the entire range of ², i.e., from ²0 to ²1. As in
section 3, the argument ² of the variables and the Lagrange multipliers Ài; i = 1;¢¢¢ ;5, to be
introduced later, will be suppressed to simplify the notation unless required for an unambiguous
notation.
























À1u1 + À2u2 + À3x1 + À4x2 + À5
¡
1 ¡ x1 ¡ x2
¢´
X l:
A solution of the problem has to satisfy the following necessary conditions:
L1ui ´ (phifui ¡ ci ¡ ¸giui)xi + Ài = 0; (7)
L1xi ´ pyi ¡ ciui ¡ Ii ¡ ¸gi + Ài+2 ¡ À5 = 0; (8)







Xld² = 0: (9)
The Lagrange multiplier ¸ is interpreted as the shadow cost of the prespeci¯ed level of
aggregate emissions z over the entire rage of quality ². Thus, z does not depend on ², and
consequently ¸ is constant over quality. For an interior solution, given quality ² and given a
3We assume that V is a concave C
2 function.
8particular technology, necessary condition (7) indicates that the value of the marginal product
of applied input per unit of asset should equal the sum of the marginal cost of input use and the
marginal cost of pollution per unit of asset. In the case of a boundary solution, the Lagrange
multiplier of the binding constraint re°ects the di®erence between the value of the marginal
product and the sum of the marginal costs. The necessary condition (8) indicates that the
marginal net bene¯ts of production per unit of asset with quality ², given a particular technology,
should equal the marginal cost of pollution per unit of asset. However, since both the production
and emission functions are linear in the ¯xed asset, the technology which has the maximal social
net returns, ¦¤
i,4 de¯ned as ¦¤
i ´ L1xi ¡ Ài+2 + À5 ´ pyi(u¤
i) ¡ ciu¤
i ¡ Ii ¡ ¸gi(u¤
i;²), will
be completely preferred to the technology with the lower social net returns, implying that the
entire asset with quality ² should be utilized in the process that yields the highest social net
returns. Hence, we obtain corner solutions where either the production units are retired and
xi(²) = 0; i = 1;2 when the social net returns for both technologies are negative, or where
xi(²) = 1 for the technology which has the highest positive social net returns. However, the
maximal social net returns for technology i, ¦¤
i depends on the asset quality and, thus, it will
change over ².
The next proposition explains how the optimal levels of the key variables changes with a
change in quality ².
Proposition 2: Input use and output increase with asset quality, and the social net return does













The proof is presented in the Appendix. Because of the multiplicative e®ect of technology,
higher asset quality has the same e®ect as a higher output price and leads to an increase in
input use and output. Proposition 2 suggests that this multiplicative e®ect is not negated by
the externality cost under our assumptions, and therefore the social net returns are likely to
increase with asset quality as well.
The modern technology will be adopted if its social net returns are positive and higher than
that of the traditional technology. The di®erence in social net returns per unit of asset with
quality ² is:
4The asterisk, as a superscript of a decision variable, indicates its optimal value, and as a superscript of a





p4y¤ ¡ c14u¤ ¡ 4cu¤
2 ¡ 4I ¡ ¸4g¤
´
; (10)
where 4 represents the di®erence in the level of the di®erent variables with the two technologies.
Equation (10) shows that the di®erence in social net returns depends on the impact of both
technologies on the revenues, input use, operational costs, and emissions. When the pollution
problem is an input externality, a precision technology will be adopted if the gain from the
higher output and lower emissions is greater than the extra variable and operational costs. In
the case of an output externality, adoption is optimal if the gain from higher output is higher
than the extra variable, operational and pollution costs.
The pattern of technology use with respect to quality depends on whether the modern
technology is a substitute (TAS) or a complement (TAC) to the asset quality. In the case of
TAS, the traditional technology is adopted at the higher end of the quality asset range, and
the modern technology at the second tier of asset quality. In the case of TAC, the modern
technology is adopted at the higher end of asset quality, and traditional technology at the lower
end - see Figure 1a and 1b.
First consider the case of an input externality where the modern technology is a precision
technology. The reason for the di®erent pattern is that the adoption of the modern technology
increases output and reduces pollution under both TAS and TAC while increasing variable and
operational costs, but the gain from adoption occurs at di®erent asset qualities. In the case
of TAS, the modern technology does not provide yield gain or pollution saving at the highest
quality (² = 1), but it still entails extra costs. Thus, ¦¤
2(² = 1) > ¦¤
1(² = 1) and the traditional
technology is superior. Because of the concavity of the di®erence h1(²) ¡ h2(²) > 0, the gain
from the adoption of modern technology increases within a range as quality asset quality declines
below 1. Thus, there may exist an asset quality ²S, with ¦¤
1(²S) = ¦¤
2(²S), which separates a
segment ²S · ² · 1 where the traditional technology is optimal and a segment of lower asset
qualities where the modern technology is optimal. Non negativity constraints may set a lower
bound ²L
1 to the previous segment, where ²L
1 is de¯ned by ¦¤
1(²L
1) = 0, and the segment of the
modern technology is limited by ²L
1 · ² · ²S
1.5
Figure 1a and 1b
5In some cases where the di®erence between the costs of the di®erent technologies are su±ciently high, there







SS) separating the range of ² in three segments. Thus, it is
optimal to use the traditional technology at the lower and higher segments, ²
L
2 · ² · ²
SS and ²
S · ² · 1, where
²
L




2 ) = 0, and the modern technology will be adopted at the middle segment, ²
SS · ² · ²
S.
10In the case of TAC where h1 is convex, the gain in productivity of the new technology is
increasing with asset quality, and thus if adoption occurs it will be on the range of higher asset
quality. In this case, it is likely to have a two segment solution. As depicted in Figure 1b, the
traditional technology is adopted at ²L
2 · ² · ²S, where ²L
2 is de¯ned by ¦¤
2(²L
2) = 0, and the
modern technology is adopted at ²S · ² · 1.
Similar patterns of adoption can also be found for the case of an output externality. However,
the only gain from the adoption of modern technology is higher output associated with higher
variable, operational and pollution costs. Thus, the segments where it is optimal to adopt the
modern technology contracts relative to the case of an input externality presented in Figure 1a
and 1b.
3.2. The optimal dynamic solution
To analyze how the optimal solution is a®ected over time, we maximize the value function














_ s(t) = z(t) ¡ ´(t) ¡ ³ s(t); s(0) = s0; ´(t) 2 [0;s(t)]:
The variable z of the ¯rst-stage problem still denotes aggregate emissions and becomes the
decision variable in the second stage. However, it now depends on t. Thus, the decision variables
in the intertemporal allocation problem are z(t) and the stock abatement ´(t). Hence, we will
be able to analyze the optimal mix of source abatement versus stock abatement. The current







z(t) ¡ ´(t) ¡ ³s(t)
´
, where ' denotes the costate variable. It indicates the \user cost" of the
pollution stock, i.e., it re°ects the marginal cost of reducing the pollution stock and the value
of pollution in production over time. Taking account of the constraints leads to the Lagrangian:




. The ¯rst-order conditions read as follows:
11L2z ´ Vz ¡ ' = 0; ) ¸ = ' (11)
L2´ ´ ¡k´ + ' + À6 ¡ À7 = 0; (12)




' ¡ ms ¡ ks + À7; (13)
_ s = z ¡ ´ ¡ ³s; s(0) = s0: (14)
Equation (11) states that the marginal value of aggregate emissions to producers should
equal the temporal shadow cost of the pollution stock '. By the Envelope Theorem, a change
in the value function as a result of a change in the right-hand side value, z, of the constraint of
problem (S1) is equal to ¸. Thus, we have Vz = ¸ for a change in z, and therefore the shadow
prices of the aggregate pollution in problems (S1) and (S2) are identical, i.e., ¸ = '. Equation
(12) indicates, for an interior solution, that the marginal cost of stock abatement should equal
the shadow cost of pollution stock. However, two di®erent boundary solutions are possible.
If the marginal stock abatement cost is greater than the shadow cost of the pollution stock,
i.e., k´ > '; 8´, stock abatement will be equal to zero. In this case, it is optimal to reduce
pollution exclusively at the source. On the contrary, if the marginal stock abatement cost is
lower than the shadow cost of the pollution stock, i.e., k´ < '; 8´, it is optimal to abate the
entire pollution stock, that is, ´(t) = s(t). Equation (13) suggests that the cost of a one-period
delay in generating a marginal unit of pollutant stock will be the extra discounting and forgone
depreciation bene¯ts (±+³)' minus the temporal marginal social cost of the pollutant stock ms
and the marginal e®ect of pollutant stock on stock abatement cost ks.
For a sustainable environmental policy, the social planner is particularly interested in the
achievement of a steady state, de¯ned by equations (13) and (14) with _ ' = _ s = 0. For any initial
value of s within the neighborhood of s1, where the superscript 1 indicates the steady-state
equilibrium value, it is possible to ¯nd a corresponding value of the shadow cost, which assures
that the optimal environmental abatement policy leads toward the long-run optimum.6
The description of the characteristics of the steady state presented in the main body of the
paper is based on the case where the marginal abatement cost are nonincreasing, i.e., k´s · 0.
The mathematical analysis for this case, as well as the case where the cleanup technology is
characterized by k´s ¸ 0 is presented in the section, Analysis of the Steady State, in the Appen-
dix, and shows that the qualitative characteristics of the steady state are likely to be identical.
6This result holds only for values within a certain neighborhood of the steady state, as our steady-state analysis
has local character.
12For k´s · 0, the analysis shows that the steady-state equilibrium is locally characterized by a























The resulting phase diagram is depicted in Figure 2.7 However, It shows that the stable
path leading to the steady state is upward sloping, while the unstable path is downward sloping
and, thus, the pollution stock and its shadow cost evolve in the same direction. Therefore, any
pollution abatement policy is characterized by a decrease in the shadow cost.
Figure 2
The fact that the pollution stock and its shadow cost evolve in the same direction over time
allows us to derive the optimal intertemporal combination of source abatement versus stock
abatement. Moreover, it allows us to determine the evolution of the optimal input use over
time. The results for an interior solution are summarized in the following proposition.
Proposition 3: Given that the initial stock of pollution, s0, is greater (smaller) than the steady-
state stock of pollution, s1, the optimal dynamic policy consists of:
(a) choosing the aggregate emissions z(0) and the input use ui(0;²); i = 1;2; initially below
(above) their steady-state values z1 and u1
i , and in gradually increasing z(t) and ui(t;²); i =
1;2; until z1 and u1
i are reached, and
(b) in choosing the initial stock abatement ´(0) above (below) its steady-state value ´1, and in
gradually decreasing (increasing) ´(t) until ´1 is reached.
The proof of Proposition 3 (a) is presented in the Appendix. Suppose that the initial
pollution stock, s0, is greater than its steady-state value, s1, and the implementation of a
pollution abatement policy is required. Given the fact that the stable path leading to the steady
state is upward sloping, the initial shadow cost, '(0), is also greater than its steady-state value.
According to equations (11) and (12), the optimal initial values of the emissions and the stock
abatement are determined by the initial shadow cost. As the stock of pollution decreases over
time, the shadow cost has to decrease as well. Consequently, by equation (12) and the convexity
of the abatement cost function, k, one can conclude that stock abatement decreases over time.
Moreover, lower shadow cost provokes an increase in the intensity of production leading to a
7The curvature of the isoclines depends on the third derivatives of the functions. However, since they have
not been speci¯ed, we have drawn for simplicity the isoclines as linear functions.
13higher level of aggregate emissions. Therefore, an intertemporally and quality-di®erentiated
optimal pollution abatement policy, for s0 > s1, can be characterized by choosing the levels
of applied input initially below their steady-state values. As time passes, they increase until
their steady-state values are reached. Figure 3 depicts the evolution of the stock abatement and
aggregate emissions over time.
Figure 3
The curvature of the abatement cost function determines the speed of the decrease in
stock abatement. Given an interior solution, equation (12) requires that the marginal stock
abatement cost is equal to the shadow cost. The shadow cost decreases, along the optimal
path, if s0 > s1. Therefore, the marginal stock abatement cost has to decrease as well. The
decrease of the shadow cost translates to slower decrease in stock abatement the more convex
the stock abatement cost function is. Thus, along the optimal path we see that stock abatement
is decreased, and abatement e®ort at the source is increased.
Given the dynamic setting of the social planner's decision problem, the technology adoption
pattern will change over time. As shown in the previous section, the shadow price of emissions
decreases (increases) over time if the steady-state value of the pollutant is above (below) its
initial value. In the case of an input externality and independently of whether we have the case
of TAS or TAC, a decrease in the shadow price over time leads to a higher increase in the social
net return function of the traditional technology than that of the modern technology given that
g1(u1;²) < g2(u2;²); 8u1 = u2 > 0; and ² < 1. Hence, by graphical analysis, one can see from
Figures 1a and 1b that the range of the quality of the asset where the traditional technology
is adopted expands and the range where the precision technology is adopted contracts. In
the case of an output externality, the dynamic technology adoption pattern is reversed since
g1(u1;²) > g2(u2;²); 8u1 = u2 > 0 and ² > 0. On the other hand, if the shadow price increases
over time, we obtain an increase in the adoption of modern technology in the case of an input
externality and a reduction in the case of an output externality.
4. Optimal quality di®erentiated and intertemporal policies
The social optimum, characterized by the equations (7) - (9), is not equivalent to the private
optimum since producers do not consider the externality. At each period of time, the private
decision problem of the producers can be expressed as a private net-returns maximization prob-
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1 ] denotes quality range of the assets available to an individual producer, lP is the









, and XP is the amount of assets
available to the producer.
The optimality conditions for the private decision problem are similar to the ¯rst-order
conditions (7) and (8) of problem (S1). The only di®erence is that the shadow price of pollution
stock, ', is zero. Thus, producers choose the level of inputs where the value of the marginal
product is equal to its price (equation (7) with ' = 0). Adoption of modern technologies occurs,
independent from the marginal cost of pollution, when the marginal net value of adoption is
greater than its marginal costs. In reality, we observe that modern technologies are adopted to
a substantial extent, even though producers do not face the shadow cost of the pollution stock.
Thus, if producers were faced with this cost, producers owning assets with a certain quality
would adopt in addition to the producers that already have adopted.
Since prices are constant over time, individual producers solving problem (P) will choose the
same level of inputs and the same technology at every moment of time. However, the pollution
stock changes over time and, without stock abatement, it may actually be growing fast. Thus,
explicit pricing of the pollution is triggering a gradual adoption process over asset quality and
time by the individual ¯rm.
The solution of problem (P) leads to a private behavior where aggregate emissions are
above the socially optimal level. Therefore, government intervention is indicated, for instance,
in the form of a ¯rst-best policy by a tax on individual emissions. However, individual emissions
often cannot be observed due to high costs or technical infeasibility (Knopman and Smith, 1993)
and, therefore, policymakers must resort to other policy measures where the key variables are
observable and correlate as close as possible to individual emissions (Braden and Segerson, 1993).
These selection criteria are met by individually tailored input taxes supported by individually
tailored technology taxes or subsidies. Since the pollution function is linear with respect to the
¯xed asset, the following proposition establishes policies that lead to the optimal level of input
15and technology choice.
Proposition 4: Provided that input use and technology choices can be observed at each unit
with quality ², an optimal policy can be obtained by
² a quality di®erentiated input tax ¿i; i = 1;2; given by ¿i(²) = ¸¤giui(u¤
i(²);²); i = 1;2,
together with




The proof is presented in the Appendix. An input tax alone, however, is not suf¯cient to
achieve the social optimum since it only establishes equation (7) but not equation (8). That is,
the introduction of a tax on the intensive margin causes a distortion on the extensive margin. To
establish the socially ef¯cient allocation of technologies, the input tax needs to be complemented
by a technology subsidy/tax. The yet undetermined sign of ¾i; i = 1;2; determines when we
have a technology subsidy or tax. In the case where it is positive, we have a technology tax. If
it is negative, we have, in fact, a subsidy. To determine the sign of ¾i; i = 1;2; we substitute








Employing the Mean Value Theorem (Theorem 2.17 in de la Fuente, 2000, p. 258), we
know that gi(ui;²) is strictly convex in ui if giui(u¤
i;²)u¤
i > gi(u¤
i;²). Hence, if the marginal
contribution of applied input to pollution is increasing, ¾i; i = 1;2; is negative. In other words,








i;²); ¾i; i = 1;2; is zero. The latter case implies that a quality-
di®erentiated input tax alone is able to establish the social optimum and does not need to be
complemented by a technology tax or subsidy.
In the case of an input externality, the pollution function may be linear or strictly convex.
If the pollution function is linear in the input, then a tax on input use is equivalent to a tax
on individual emissions. Therefore, no additional taxes or subsidies are needed on the extensive
margin. However, if the pollution function is strictly convex, the introduction of an input tax
alone leads to a change in the optimal intensity which, in turn, distorts the decision of technology
adoption. As a result of these two adjustments, the resulting amount of pollution is not socially
optimal. Thus, input taxes need to be complemented by technology subsidies that promote
16the adoption of precision technologies. In this case, the optimal policy consists of decreasing
the intensity of production and expanding the extensive margin. On the contrary, in the case
of an output externality, the pollution function is strictly concave, and input taxes need to
be complemented by technology taxes to moderate the adoption of modern technology. The
reduction at the intensive margin is complemented by a reduction at the extensive margin, thus,
both margins act complementary.
The speci¯c design of policy instruments based on input and/or technology choice has to
simultaneously take into account the varying quality of the asset and the aspect of time. In this
way the policies can be adjusted according to the characteristics of the potential emissions of the
production unit. Moreover, technology and input use are easy to monitor so that the policies
can be enforced in practice as well. These taxes are adjusted over time in line with the changes
of the shadow cost of the pollutant that varies according to the development of the stock of
pollutant over time.
Proposition 4 also demonstrates the importance of an early regulation. If the regulator
designs a policy when the pollution stock is smaller than its steady-state value, the initial policy
is smooth and, since the shadow cost increases over time, it becomes more restrictive till the
steady state is reached. On the contrary, if pollution problems were ignored for a long time
and the intervention occurred at a crisis situation where the pollution stock is greater than its
steady-state level, the policymaker needs to impose draconian measures in the short run that
will be reduced till the steady state is attained.
5. Summary and conclusions
This paper presents a modeling approach for the socially optimal management of an accumu-
lating pollutant generated by heterogeneous producers. The paper considers source abatement
by reduction of input use, retirement of production units (x1 = x2 = 0), choice of technology,
and stock abatement. The proposed solution procedure decomposes the optimization problem
over time and asset quality into two stages. In the ¯rst stage the optimal form of the utilization
of the quality-di®erentiated asset is determined subject to an aggregate emission constraint. In
the second stage, the socially optimal intertemporal equilibrium is determined by optimizing the
solution of the ¯rst stage over time.
Due to the presence of an externality, the private net return-maximizing strategy of the pro-
ducers does not produce the socially optimal outcome. Thus, environmental policies in the form
17of individually tailored input taxes (intensive margin) and individually tailored technology taxes
or subsidies (extensive margin) are proposed to induce individual di®erentiated responses rather
than uniform responses. The results show that regulations at the extensive margin should not be
considered as a substitute for regulations at the intensive margin but, rather, as indispensable
complements. Moreover, if the emission function is concave, complementary regulations at the
extensive margin require to impose a technology tax to achieve the socially optimal outcome
that moderates adoption of modern technologies and, if the emission function is convex, the
payment of subsidies will trigger adoption of precision technologies. Moreover, the speci¯cation
of the relationship between technology and asset quality determines the adoption pattern of each
technology over asset quality.
Considering the aspect of time and quality simultaneously permits formulating the necessary
changes to transform an individually tailored optimal, yet static, environmental policy to an
intertemporally and individually tailored optimal policy. In particular, the temporal aspect of
the regulation is of great importance, since it determines how the optimal composition and the
intensity of the regulation at the intensive and extensive margins change over time.
With the advent of geographic information systems, reduced computation cost, and im-
proved monitoring technologies, the discriminatory policies presented here are becoming feasible.
We show that optimality can be also attained by incentives, even without direct measurement
of pollution at the microlevel. Good estimates of production and pollution-generation functions,
and information on microlevel and input use at the microlevel, are su±cient to yield optimal
outcomes.
The model presented here abstracts from some important issues that should be addressed
in future research. Some can be incorporated into the existing framework without altering the
main results of the paper. For example, learning by doing (reduction in operational costs of new
technologies as manufacturers learn from experience) may be introduced by having I1(t) with
@I1=@t < 0, @2I1=@t2 ¸ 0. Learning by using (improvement in the use of technology or users
learning from their and others' experience) may be presented by a production function where
the ¯xed-asset e®ect of the modern technology depends on time, i.e., h1(²; t) with @h1=@t > 0,
or where the ¯xed-asset e®ect depends on a second stock variable, denoted by L1, that measures
the aggregate of the asset utilized with the modern technology, i.e., h1(²;L1; t), with @h1=@t > 0.
Uncertainty and irreversibility of the emission or the performance of the technologies might have
to be recognized using the Dixit-Pindyck real option model. The approach taken here may have
some problems in situations where the cost of the reversal of the adoption process changes over
18time. These costs can be accounted for by the introduction of a new state variable for capital
that is distributed over quality. The extension of the model to a distributed optimal control
problem is considered as a challenge of future research.
19Appendix
Proof of Proposition 2
To determine the e®ect of a change in asset quality on the level of applied input, we
di®erentiate equation (7) with respect to ² and solve for @u¤













@² > 0. For the case of an output externality, substituting gi(ui;²) by its value ®yi,
equation (7) reads as:
L1ui ´
¡
(p ¡ ¸®)hifui ¡ ci
¢
xi + Ài = 0:











i=@² is positive in both externality cases.
Since the function f(ui) has regular, neoclassical properties, we obtain for the case of an











The changes in the allocation of the technologies are determined in the case of an input




i) ¡ ¸gi² > 0: (A.3)




i ¡ Ii, since gi(ui(²);²) is given by ®yi. Di®erentiation of the social net returns with respect
to ² yields
¦¤
i² = (p ¡ ¸®)h0
if(u¤
i) ¸ 0: (A.4)
Equation (A.4) is strictly positive for (p ¡ ¸®) > 0. The inequality (p ¡ ¸®) < 0 corresponds
to a situation where the social net returns are negative for every quality of the asset, and hence
no production takes place, that is, u¤
i = 0;8² 2 [0;1]. Therefore, (p ¡ ¸®) < 0 implies that
f(u¤
i) = 0 and consequently ¦¤
i² = 0.¥
Analysis of the Steady State
20Assuming an interior solution, equations (11) and (12) can be solved globally and uniquely
by using Theorem 6 in Gale and Nikaid^ o (1965) for z = ^ z(';s) and ´ = ^ ´(';s). By the implicit


















































For the purposes of a qualitative analysis, we reduce the necessary conditions (11) - (14) to
a pair of di®erential equations in ' and s by substituting z = ^ z(';s) and ´ = ^ ´(';s) into (13)





' ¡ ms ¡ ks(^ ´(';s);s); (A.7)
_ s = ^ z(';s) ¡ ^ ´(';s) ¡ ³s; s(0) = s0: (A.8)
A linearization of the canonical system of di®erential equations around the steady-state























The implicit function theorem is also used to calculate the elements of the Jacobian matrix






















We can distinguish three di®erent cases, depending on the value of k´s=k´´; case A: k´s=k´´ ·
³, case B: k´s=k´´ ¸ ± + ³, and case C: ³ < k´s=k´´ < ± + ³. For case A where k´s=k´´ · ³, the













In this case, the determinant of the Jacobian matrix is negative. Moreover, since the trace of
21the Jacobian matrix, trJ, is equal to ± > 0, the eigenvalues have opposite signs. Therefore, the
steady-state equilibrium is locally characterized by a saddle point. This will always be the case























and the stable path leading to the steady state is upward sloping, while the unstable path is
downward sloping.
However, if k´s ¸ 0, cases A, B, and C are possible. In the case where k´s=k´´ ¸ ±+³ (case













Like in case A, the determinant of the Jacobian matrix is negative and the steady-state
equilibrium is locally characterized by a saddle point. The slope of both isoclines is di®erent,
but the slope of the stable path is still positive.













In case C, the determinant of the Jacobian matrix might not be negative. If it is positive,
two complex eigenvalues may result, where the real parts of the eigenvalues are given by ±=2.
Under these conditions, the \equilibrium" is characterized by an unstable spiral. However, if
the Jacobian matrix and the discriminant of the characteristic equation are positive, the two
eigenvalues are positive and real, leading to an \equilibrium" in the form of a source.
Yet, if the determinant of the Jacobian matrix is negative, the steady-state equilibrium is
again locally characterized by a saddle point, however the slope of both isoclines is positive and
the slope of the stable path is negative. Since case C is very speci¯c and not likely to occur in
reality as it requires a large ±, our analysis concentrates on cases A and B.
Proof of Proposition 3
To ¯nd the optimal intertemporal path of ^ z(t) and ^ ´(t), we totally di®erentiate with respect






















Thus, the optimal path of ^ z(t) and ^ ´(t) is determined by the path of ' and s. Taking into
account that ' and s evolve according to Figure 2 in the same direction allows us to determine
the sign of d^ z=dt and d^ ´=dt.
Additionally, we conduct a comparative static analysis to determine the e®ect of a change
in the shadow cost on the level of input use. Since neither V nor ¸ depend on ², we assume that
the technologies are located optimally, and the amount of pollution is chosen optimally. The
sign of @u¤
i=@¸ can be determined by solving the ¯rst-order equation (7) for ui = u¤
i(¸); i = 1;2;
















Using equations (A.15), (A.16), and the fact that ¸ = ', allows to verify Proposition 3. ¥
Proof of Proposition 4
When producers are facing a quality-di®erentiated input tax and a quality-di®erentiated
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XP lP ¸ 0:
















1 ¡ x1 ¡ x2
¢´
XP lP:
The ¯rst-order conditions read as follows
23LT
ui ´ (phifui ¡ ci ¡ ¿i)xi + Ài = 0; (A.18)
LT
xi ´ pyi ¡ ciui ¡ Ii ¡ (¿iui + ¾i) + Ài+2 ¡ À5 = 0: (A.19)
Substituting the values of ¿i and ¾i into equations (A.18) and (A.19) leads to
LT
ui ´ (phifui ¡ ci ¡ ¸¤giui)xi + Ài = 0; (A.20)
LT
xi ´ pyi ¡ ciui ¡ Ii ¡ ¸¤gi(ui;²)) + Ài+2 ¡ À5 = 0: (A.21)
The comparison of the necessary conditions (A.20) and (A.21) with the necessary conditions
(7) and (8) of the social optimum shows that the input tax ¿i; i = 1;2; together with the
technology subsidy or tax ¾i; i = 1;2; establish the quality-di®erentiated optimal input use and
technology choice for every quality ². ¥
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a) Technology asset substitution
b) Technology asset complementarity
28Figure 2: The Phase Diagram in the (s; ') Space.
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Figure 3: Optimal Intertemporal Abatement Policy.
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